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Summary
Although animals (particularly tool-users) are capable
of solving physical tasks in the laboratory [1–7], the de-
gree to which they understand them in terms of their
underlying physical forces is a matter of contention.
Here, using a new paradigm, the two-trap tube task,
we report the performance of non-tool-using rooks. In
contrast to the low success rates of previous studies
using trap-tube problems [1–4], seven out of eight
rooks solved the initial task, and did so rapidly. Instead
of the usual, conceptually flawed [8] control, we used
a series of novel transfer tasks to test for understand-
ing. All seven transferred their solution across a
change in stimuli. However, six out of seven were un-
able to transfer to two further tasks, which did not
share any one visual constant. One female was able
to solve these further transfer tasks. Her result is sug-
gestive evidence that rooks are capable of sophisti-
cated physical cognition, if not through an understand-
ing of unobservable forces [3, 9], perhaps through rule
abstraction. Our results highlight the need to investi-
gate cognitive mechanisms other than causal under-
standing in studying animal physical cognition.
Results and Discussion
Many studies of cognition reveal that animals are capa-
ble of solving physical tasks in the laboratory [1–7]. Ex-
planations for this ability have traditionally fallen into
two main categories: a low-level model based on asso-
ciative learning, in which cause and effect are linked
through exposure to their contiguity; and a high-level
cognitive model in which the tasks are solved through
an understanding of their underlying causal structure.
Associative learning based on an arbitrary cue results
in the formation of a task-specific solution. However,
an understanding of causality may allow an animal to
transfer what it has learned in one task to a novel one
based on the same principles, an ability thought to be
*Correspondence: nsc22@cam.ac.ukevolutionarily favored in animals living in complex envi-
ronments (e.g., the Environmental Complexity Thesis
[10, 11]). Much of the evidence suggests that animals
do not have a human-like appreciation of causal regular-
ities, leading some theorists to posit that animals are
incapable of reasoning about the unobservable forces
underlying events [3, 9].
The trap-tube task (in which an animal must use a tool
to extract a food reward from a horizontal tube, which
has a ‘‘trap’’ along its length into which the food will
drop if pulled or pushed over it, Figure 1) has become
the benchmark test for causal understanding in the
physical domain, and it has been used to test a variety
of tool-users. There is no convincing evidence to sug-
gest that any animal tested with this paradigm has
shown an understanding of its causal properties [12].
We tested rooks (Corvus frugilegus) on a modification
of the trap-tube task to investigate whether this non-
tool-using bird could solve this task, and if so, whether
its solution would be best explained by the low-level or
high-level model.
Eight naive rooks were tested on the modified ‘‘two-
trap tube’’ task. In Experiment 1, we presented four
rooks with Tube A and four with Tube B (Figure 2).
Both of these designs feature two traps along a horizon-
tal tube with a piece of food positioned between them.
One is functional—food will fall into it and be trapped.
The other is nonfunctional— if it is to be retrieved, the
food must be moved toward this trap. In order to test
a non-tool-using species, we adapted the task so that
the tool was already inside the apparatus: a stick with
two clear discs, which enclose the food, attached to it,
such that moving the stick will move the food. In Tube
A, the food could be pulled across the top of the non-
functional trap, and in Tube B it could fall through it
and be recovered from below. The birds were each given
one block of ten trials per day, with the left-right orienta-
tion of the tube randomized so that the functional trap
occurred an equal number of times on both sides. The
birds were deemed to have solved the problem if they
made 15 or more correct responses over two consecu-
tive blocks of ten trials (a result that is significant accord-
ing to a Binomial test with a set at 0.05). If after 150 trials
the bird had not reached the threshold, then testing
ended.
As seen in Figure 3, seven of the eight rooks learned
the initial problem, although the number of trials re-
quired to achieve significance varied considerably
among individuals.
The traditional control used to assess how an animal
has solved the trap-tube task is the use of an inverted
trap tube such that the trap is above the tube and no lon-
ger effective (Figure 1). This control is based on the
premise that animals that have understood the causal
nature of the task should no longer avoid an ineffective
trap. However, because there is no cost to doing so,
we cannot be sure that an animal that does so has un-
derstood nothing about causality. Recent findings by
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necessarily avoid an ineffective trap [8]. These authors
also point out that predicting a null effect in this way is
a weaker test of a hypothesis than predicting a specific
behavioral outcome. We adopted a different approach
and used transfer tasks, in which the causal properties
of the task remain the same but the appearance of
the arbitrary stimulus differs, in order to address this
problem, an approach advocated by Heyes [13] and
adopted to investigate understanding in other para-
digms (e.g., [7]).
In Experiment 2, we tested birds that had solved Tube
A on Tube B, and vice versa, to assess whether or not
they could transfer (respond significantly correctly
within the first 20 trials) to this new task. All of the birds
that had learned the initial two-trap tube task were able
to do this, and all were correct on their first trial (Figure 3).
Furthermore, when retested on ten trials of their original
task, all seven performed significantly better than
chance (5 out of 10 correct). This immediate transfer
Figure 1. The Trap-Tube Test, Which Has Been Used to Test a Vari-
ety of Tool-Using Animals, and the Control Task Used in a Number of
these Studies to Test for Understandingfrom one physical task to a novel one, based on the
same causal principles, could be explained by the for-
mation of an understanding of the underlying causal
structure of the task. Alternatively, both of these tasks
could have been solved by avoiding the feature they
had in common, the functional trap with a black disc at
the bottom (see Figure 2).
In the third experiment, we precluded the use of a rule
based on this cue present in Tubes A and B (the black
disc at the bottom of one of the traps), by using two
further transfer tasks. Each design featured the two pre-
viously nonfunctional traps within the same tube (Fig-
ure 2). However, the tube was manipulated such that
one of these would now trap the food. The cue common
to Tubes A and B was absent. In Tube C, the ‘‘pass-
across’’ trap was made functional, because bungs
were placed in the tube ends to prevent the food from
passing through the open end of the tube. Once the stick
had been pulled one way, it disappeared behind the
bung on the other side, so that if a bird made the wrong
response, it could not correct its mistake. In Tube D, the
‘‘drop-down’’ trap was made functional, because the
whole tube was lowered such that the food could no lon-
ger be retrieved from below. Critically, the visual stimu-
lus that could have been used as an arbitrary cue to
solve these tasks, namely, the position of the black
disc at the top of one of the traps, was the same in
both tasks, but each task required the opposite re-
sponse (pull away from the black disc in Tube C, pull to-
ward it in Tube D). Subjects could not, therefore, solve
both tasks through the use of a single procedural rule
based on the configuration of the black disc. We gave
the birds two blocks of ten trials in which to achieve sig-
nificance according to a binomial test (9 or 10 correct out
of 10, or 15 or more correct out of 20).
Six of the birds failed to transfer in Experiment 3 (Fig-
ure 4). They appeared to perform somewhat better onFigure 2. Experimental Apparatus
Tubes A and B were used in Experiments 1 and 2, and Tubes C and D were used in Experiment 3. A stick is already inserted into the tube at the
start of the trial, and the food is enclosed by clear Perspex discs such that it will move with the stick whichever way it is pulled. Each tube has two
‘‘traps’’ along its length, and each has different solutions depending upon the position of horizontal black discs at the top or bottom of these
traps. The arrow shows the path the food will take on a successful trial.
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Panel (A) shows those birds that received
Tube A in Experiment 1 and Tube B in Exper-
iment 2 (subjects shown by closed symbols:
Selvino = diamond, Fonteyn = triangle, Fry =
square, and Callas = circle); Panel (B) shows
those that received Tube B first (subjects
shown by open symbols: Cooper = diamond,
Curie = triangle, Guillem = square, and Coo-
per = circle). The horizontal dotted line in
each graph shows chance performance (5
out of 10 trials correct). The vertical lines sep-
arate results from different tubes, and the
boxes above the x axis show which of the
tubes were used.Tube C than Tube D, but this difference was not sig-
nificant (paired t test, n = 6, p = 0.13). Learning to pull
toward one type of nonfunctional trap in the first experi-ment (i.e., pass-across in Tube A, drop-down in Tube B)
did not facilitate performance on the transfer in which
they had to pull toward the same type (i.e., pass-acrossFigure 4. Results of Experiment 3
Panel (A) shows those birds that received Tube C and then Tube D; Panel B shows those that received Tube D first. Subjects are shown by the
same symbols as used in Figure 3, so that closed symbols show subjects that received Tube A in Experiment 1 and open symbols show subjects
that received Tube B. Fonteyn did not learn the first task in 150 trials and therefore did not continue to these transfers. The horizontal dotted line in
each graph shows chance performance (5 out of 10 trials correct). The vertical lines separate results from different tubes, and the boxes above
the x axis show which of the tubes were used.
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700in D, drop-down in C) (paired t test, n = 6, p = 0.46). Re-
markably, one bird, Guillem, passed both Tubes C and D
within the first block of ten trials, scoring 9 out of 10 in
the former and 10 out of 10 in the latter, a result that is
significant according to a binomial test. This striking
performance could not be based on a simple procedural
rule, as explained above.
These experiments have demonstrated that rooks are
capable of solving a physical problem at least as compli-
cated as any previously solved by tool-using primates.
They solve these tasks surprisingly fast as compared
to any of the tool-using species so far tested on related
problems. One possibility for this is the fact that, al-
though they are not tool-users, rooks are the only cor-
vids reported to cache food by digging a hole before
placing the food inside it and then covering it over [14].
Given that the traps are effectively holes, it may be
that learning what constitutes a functional hole is an
ecologically relevant problem for a rook. Corvids are
also opportunistic generalists [14] for whom rapid learn-
ing is likely to confer a high survival advantage.
Other possible explanations for this difference may be
considered: Shettleworth [15] has pointed out that many
of the primates used in similar experiments (e.g., [3])
have participated in a variety of other physical tasks (un-
like our rooks), which could have interfered with their
learning; secondly, the rooks were not required to insert
a tool, and this could also potentially facilitate learning
on the task; lastly, it is possible that pulling food toward
oneself is a more natural behavior for animals than push-
ing it away, and this improvement in ‘‘external validity’’
[16] may also be a facilitatory factor. We suggest that fu-
ture studies on primates could investigate these alterna-
tive hypotheses by employing the methodology used in
this study.
Given that six of the seven rooks failed to transfer to
Tubes C and D, which had no visual features in common
with the first task, it seems unlikely that they had an un-
derstanding of the unobservable causal properties of
the task at their disposal. However, it is possible that
the novel features of the transfer tasks made them diffi-
cult to solve; perhaps the problem appeared too differ-
ent. This is one of the limitations of using transfer tests,
in which one must change the appearance of the tasks.
The surprising performance of Guillem, who solved all
four tasks despite the lack of a constant arbitrary visual
cue, deserves further attention. A possible account of
Guillem’s performance is that she had understood the
unobservable features of the task, a result that would
contradict the hypothesis that animals are incapable of
learning about such features [3, 9]. However, the propo-
nents of this hypothesis have suggested that sophisti-
cated cognition may be possible without this ability,
through the formation of ‘‘concepts’’ or ‘‘representa-
tions’’ based on observable features of problems. In
this task, Guillem could have abstracted a rule based
on the observable features of the task, such as surface
continuity and the inability of objects to pass through
barriers. These kinds of concepts have been described
as constituting a simple form of knowledge about ob-
jects, one that arises earlier in human child development
than more complex causal reasoning about unobserv-
able forces, such as the notion of gravity [17, 18]. The
ability of corvids to abstract rules has been documentedin other tasks, such as matching and oddity learning
[19], learning set formation [20, 21], spatial learning
[22], tests of episodic-like memory [23, 24], and transi-
tive inference [25].
However, the result of one bird in seven must be inter-
preted with caution, and at present we cannot distin-
guish between these hypotheses. Guillem’s result in
the third experiment highlights the fact that there is
more to physical cognition than reasoning about unob-
servable forces. Rule abstraction and the formation of
representations based on observable features is one
possible reason why some animals (such as primates
and corvids) have the ability to form sophisticated cog-
nitive solutions to physical problems in the absence of
causal understanding of unobservable forces. The
adoption of transfer tasks, as opposed to control tests
that probe for an all-or-nothing possession of causal un-
derstanding, might allow us to form a better understand-
ing of how animals process their physical world.
Experimental Procedures
Study Animals and Housing
The subjects were eight rooks: Selvino (f), Curie (f), Cooper (f), Fry (f),
Cook (m), Guillem (f), Callas (f), and Fonteyn (f). None of them had
taken part in any previous cognitive experiments. They are part of
a group of 15 hand-raised rooks that were collected from two colo-
nies in Cambridge on April 16th and 17th, 2003, and housed at the
time of testing in a climate-controlled indoor aviary with a 12:12 hr
light:dark schedule. Test subjects were housed in pairs in two side
aviaries (both 2 m by 1 m) of the main housing aviary and were tested
almost daily for the duration of the study. During testing, an opaque
partition separated each individual so that they were visually iso-
lated from the other. Food and water were supplied ad libitum out-
side trial periods. The daily feed included pasta, potatoes, meat,
eggs, seeds, nuts, and fresh fruit. Food was removed 1 hr prior to
testing, and preferred foods (e.g., bacon, pork pie, pancakes, and
meal worms), which were used as rewards, were not given as part
of the regular feed.
Experimental Procedures and Apparatus
Tubes A–D were Plexiglas tubes (175 mm long3 40 mm wide), fixed
horizontally onto a wooden block (200 mm long 3 25 mm high) be-
tween two vertical Perspex panels, which were fixed to the wooden
block 150 mm apart and held the tube at an elevation of 140 mm
(measured from the base of the wooden block to the top of the
tube). A tool was inserted into the tube. It consisted of wooden
dowel with two Perspex discs attached to it, positioned in the center
of the dowel and 20 mm apart (Figure 1). A food reward was placed in
the center of the tube between the two discs. To obtain the food re-
ward, rooks had to pull the tool toward them. Subjects were tested
between June and October of 2004. Subjects were tested in blocks
of ten trials and never received more than one block of trials a day.
During a trial, an experimenter baited the apparatus, placed it on
a shelf in front of the bird, and left the room. The trial was then scored
from live video feed as either successful (the subject obtained the
food reward) or unsuccessful. The apparatus was left in for periods
of 10 min, or until the subject was successful at obtaining the food by
pulling the stick. If no response was made within 10 min, the appa-
ratus was removed for a short time and then replaced in the same
orientation.
Data Analysis
Subjects were deemed to have solved the tasks if they approached
the correct side and successfully retrieved the food in 15 or more tri-
als within two consecutive blocks. We used a binomial test to assess
the statistical significance of the performance in test trials [26], and
we used paired t tests for post-hoc comparisons of performance. Al-
pha was set at 0.05.
Physical Cognition in Rooks
701Authorization for Use of Experimental Animals
Rook nestlings were collected under English Nature licence. This
work adhered to University of Cambridge policies on animal hus-
bandry and welfare.
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